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Abstract
In this work we present additional results re-
lated to the property of strong equivalence
of logic programs. This property asserts
that two programs share the same set of sta-
ble models, even under the addition of new
rules. As shown in a recent work by Lif-
schitz, Pearce and Valverde, strong equiva-
lence can be simply reduced to equivalence in
the logic of Here-and-There (HT). In this pa-
per we provide two alternatives respectively
based on classical logic and 3-valued logic.
The former is applicable to general rules, but
not for nested expressions, whereas the latter
is applicable for nested expressions but, when
moving to an unrestricted syntax, it generally
yields different results from HT.
1 Introduction
There is no doubt that the application of logic pro-
gramming (LP) as a tool for knowledge representa-
tion has influenced in the progressive evolution of LP
towards a more logical-style orientation, avoiding the
initial syntactic restrictions. Think, for instance, how
the stable models semantics [4] has been successively
modified to cope with explicit negation and disjunc-
tive heads [5], default negation in the head [9, 6] or,
finally, the full use of nested expressions [11]. Perhaps
as a result of this evolution, the following question has
become interesting: when can we consider that two
(syntactically different) programs Π1 and Π2 represent
the same knowledge?
From a traditional LP perspective, we would say that
Π1 and Π2 are equivalent when they share the same
set of stable models like, for instance, the programs
{p} and {p ← not q} whose only stable model is {p}.
However, nonmonotonicity may cause them to behave
in a different way in the presence of additional rules
(just add fact q to both programs). Thus, if we want
to check whether Π1 and Π2 actually represent the
same knowledge, we must require a stronger condition,
talking instead about strong equivalence: for any Π,
the stable models of Π1 ∪ Π and Π2 ∪ Π coincide.
An elegant solution to this problem is the recent char-
acterization of stable models relying on Heyting’s logic
of Here-and-There (HT). In [14], Pearce first showed
that stable models can be simply seen as some kind of
minimal HT models. Then, in [10], Lifschitz, Pearce
and Valverde proved that, in fact, this characterization
fits with the semantics for nested operators indepen-
dently proposed in [11] and, what is more important,
that two programs are strongly equivalent iff they have
the same set of HT models.
In this paper we provide two closely related alterna-
tives to HT that rely on classical logic and 3-valued
logic (L3), respectively. These alternatives present the
advantage of using very well-known formalisms, which
may help for a better insight of strong equivalence (the
main emphasis of this paper), but can be useful for
implementation purposes too. Unfortunately, we also
show how, in both cases, their scope of applicability
seems to be smaller than in the HT case. This is ev-
ident for the classical encoding we present, which can
only be used as a “direct” semantics1 for non-nested
logic programs, whereas the L3 characterization prop-
erly handles nested expressions in a direct way, but
loses some important properties when nesting is also
allowed for rule conditionals.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section
recalls the basic definition of stable models for general
(non-nested) logic programs. Section 3 describes the
1Application of the classical encoding to nested expres-
sions is also possible, but only after a previous syntactic
transformation.
classical encoding. In Sections 4 and 5 we respectively
describe nested expressions and the 3-valued formal-
ization. After that, we briefly comment the differences
between the HT and L3 interpretations. Finally, Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper. Proofs of theorems have
been included in an appendix.
2 Stable models
The syntax of logic programs is defined starting from a
finite set of ground atoms Σ, called the Herbrand base,
which will serve as propositional signature. We assume
that all the variables have been previously replaced by
their possible ground instances. Letters a, b, c, d, p, q
will be used to denote atoms in Σ, and letters I, J to
denote subsets of Σ. A logic program is defined as a
collection of rules of the shape:
a1; . . . ; am; not b1; . . . ; not bn ←
c1, . . . , cr, not d1, . . . , not ds (1)
We call head (resp. body) to the left (resp. right) hand
side of the arrow in (1). The comma and the semicolon
are alternative representations of conjunction ∧ and
disjunction ∨, respectively. When m = n = 0 we
usually write ⊥ ← B instead of ← B, whereas when
r = s = 0 we directly write H instead of H ← or
H ← ⊤.
Sometimes, it will be convenient to think about pro-
gram rules as classical propositional formulas, where
← and not are respectively understood as material
implication and classical negation. In this way, the
usual expression I |= R denotes that interpretation I
satisfies rule R (seen as a classical formula), whereas
I |= Π means that I is a model of the program Π (seen
as a classical theory).
The reduct of a program Π w.r.t. some set of atoms
I, written ΠI , is defined as the result of replacing in
Π any default literal not p by ⊤, if p 6∈ I, or by ⊥
otherwise.
Definition 1 (Stable model) A set of atoms I ⊆ Σ
is a stable model of a logic program Π iff I is a minimal
model of ΠI . ✷
3 Strong equivalence in classical logic
We can think about the definition of stable models as a
try-and-error procedure which handles (propositional)
interpretations for two different purposes. On the one
hand, we start from some arbitrary interpretation Ia,
we can call the initial assumption, used to compute the
reduct ΠI
a
. On the other hand, in a second step, we
deal with minimal models of ΠI
a
which, in principle,
need not to have any connection with Ia. Each min-
imal model Ip can be seen as the set of propositions
we can prove by deductive closure using the rules in
ΠI
a
. When the proved atoms coincide with the initial
assumption, Ip = Ia, a stable model is obtained.
In order to capture this behavior, we reify all the
atoms p ∈ Σ to become arguments of two unary
predicates, assumed(p) and proved(p), that respec-
tively talk about Ia and Ip. Sort variable X will be
used for ranging over any propositional symbol in Σ.
When considering the models of any reified formula
F , we will implictly assume that they actually corre-
spond to F ∧UNA, where UNA stands for the unique
names assumption for sort Σ. This allows us identi-
fying any Herbrand model M of this type of formulas
with a pair2 (Ip, Ia) so that M [assumed] = Ia and
M [proved] = Ip. Expression M |= F represents again
satisfaction of reified formulas – ambiguity with re-
spect to I |= F is cleared by the shape of structures
and formulas.
Given this simple framework, we provide two encod-
ings: the first one is a completely straightforward trans-
lation to capture stable models, whereas the second
one is a stronger translation to characterize strong
equivalence.
Definition 2 (First translation) For any logic pro-
gram rule R like (1), we define the classical formula R˙
as the material implication:
( r∧
i=1
proved(ci)
)
∧
( s∧
i=1
¬assumed(di)
)
⊃
( n∨
i=1
proved(ai)
)
∨
( m∨
i=1
¬assumed(bi)
)
(2)
Given a logic program Π, the formula Π˙ stands for the
conjunction of all the R˙, for each rule R ∈ Π. ✷
Intuitively, to obtain the minimal models Ip of ΠI
a
we
can use an ordering relation among pairs (Ip, Ia) 
(Jp, Ja) that holds when both Ia = Ja is fixed and
Ip ⊆ Jp. The corresponding models -minimization
have a simple syntactic counterpart3: predicate cir-
cumscription CIRC[Π˙; proved]. Second, after obtain-
ing minimal models, we must further require Ip = Ia,
that is, we want pairs of shape (I, I) where what we
2The superscripts p and a, which stand here for proved
and assumed, respectively correspond to the worlds here
and there in HT or to the sets of positive and non-negative
atoms in L3.
3See Section 2.5 in [8].
assumed results to be exactly what we proved. These
pairs of shape (I, I) will be called total. Clearly, forc-
ing models to be total corresponds to including of the
formula:
∀X.
(
proved(X) ≡ assumed(X)
)
(3)
The intuitions above are not new. In fact, they were
used in Theorem 5.2 in [13] which, adapted4 to our
current presentation, states the following result:
Proposition 1 Let Σ be a propositional signature. A
set of atoms I ⊆ Σ is a stable model of a logic program
Π iff M = (I, I) satisfies the formula:
CIRC[Π˙; proved] ∧ (3)
✷
In order to capture strong equivalence of two pro-
grams, it seems that we should not only compare the
final selected models, but also the set of non-minimal
ones involved in the minimization. For instance, it is
easy to see that, due to monotonicity of classical logic,
the following proposition trivially applies:
Proposition 2 Let Π1 and Π2 be two logic programs
such that |= Π˙1 ≡ Π˙2. Then Π1 and Π2 are strongly
equivalent. ✷
Unfortunately, the opposite does not necessarily hold:
Π1 and Π2 can be strongly equivalent while Π˙1 and
Π˙2 have different models. This is because encoding
in Definition 2 allows some models which are actually
irrelevant for strong equivalence, as we will show next.
Definition 3 (Subtotal model) For any reified the-
ory T , a model (Ip, Ia) of T , with Ip ⊆ Ia, is called
subtotal iff (Ia, Ia) is also model of T . ✷
Let SUBT(T ) represent the set of subtotal models of
T (note that total models are also included). It is clear
that any model M 6∈ SUBT(Π˙) is irrelevant for select-
ing the total -minimal models, i.e., for obtaining the
stable models of Π. The next theorem shows that the
coincidence of subtotal models is a necessary condition
for strong equivalence. The proof (in the Appendix)
constitutes a direct rephrasing of that for the main
theorem in [10].
Theorem 1 Two logic programs Π1 and Π2 are
strongly equivalent iff SUBT(Π˙1) = SUBT(Π˙2) ✷
4In [13] they used a duplicated signature (atoms p and
p′) instead of reification and, therefore, they actually ap-
plied parallel circumscription. This result seems to have
been first presented in [12].
Theorem 1 points out that the Π˙ encoding is still too
weak for a full characterization of strong equivalence.
We show next how, using a more restrictive transla-
tion (that is, adding more formulas) it is possible to
obtain theories for which all their models are subtotal.
To understand how to do this, consider the example
program Π0 = {p← q} where:
Π˙0
def
= proved(q) ⊃ proved(p)
This formula has 12 models: it restricts the extent of
proved to 3 cases (∅, {p} and {p, q}) leaving free, in
each case, the 4 possibilities for assumed.
({p, q}, {p, q}) ({p}, {p}) (∅, ∅)
({p}, {p, q})
OO
(∅, {p})
OO
(∅, {p, q})
OO
Figure 1: Subtotal models of Π˙0.
Figure 1 shows the 6 subtotal models of Π˙0, represent-
ing the -ordering relationships among them. Notice
how subtotal models always satisfy Ip ⊆ Ia, that is,
we can require:
∀X.
(
proved(X) ⊃ assumed(X)
)
(4)
Unfortunatley, the addition of this axiom is still not
enough to rule out all the irrelevant models. For
instance, Π˙0 ∧ (4) has still one non-subtotal model:
(∅, {q}). This model, however, has the particularity
that its assumed atoms Ia = {q} do not satisfy the
original program rule: Ia 6|= p ← q. As it is well-
known, any stable model I of a program Π, is also a
classical model: I |= Π. So, instead of starting from
any arbitrary initial assumption Ia, we can begin re-
quiring Ia |= Π. This can be easily incorporated into
the encoding as follows. For each logic program rule
R like (1), we define R¨ as:
( r∧
i=1
assumed(ci)
)
∧
( s∧
i=1
¬assumed(di)
)
⊃
( n∨
i=1
assumed(ai)
)
∨
( m∨
i=1
¬assumed(bi)
)
(5)
Again, Π¨ stands for the conjunction of R¨ for all R ∈ Π.
Definition 4 (Second translation) For any logic
program Π we define the formula Π∗
def
= Π˙ ∧ Π¨ ∧ (4).
✷
The proof for the following theorem uses well-known
properties of circumscription (see [8]) to show that the
additional formulas do not affect to the final set of
stable models.
Theorem 2 For any logic program Π:
CIRC[Π∗; proved] ∧ (3) ≡ CIRC[Π˙; proved] ∧ (3) ✷
But, of course, the real interest of Π∗ is that it finally
rules out irrelevant models:
Property 1 Let Π be a logic program. Then, any
model M = (Ip, Ia) of Π∗ is subtotal. ✷
Finally, this property, together with theorem 1, di-
rectly implies:
Theorem 3 Two logic programs Π1 and Π2 are
strongly equivalent iff |= Π∗1 ≡ Π
∗
2. ✷
4 Nested expressions.
The previous section has shown a way of reducing
strong equivalence of logic programs into a simple
equivalence test in classical logic, providing in this
way a (we think) easier alternative to the HT char-
acterization. However, although we gain in simplicity,
it must be noticed that we lose in semantic quality:
this classical encoding does not provide a general in-
terpretation for program connectives but, instead, is
limited to rules of shape (1). The HT characterization
is clearly stronger in this sense, since it provides a di-
rect interpretation for any possible nesting of program
connectives.
In [11] a more general shape for program rules was con-
sidered. A nested expression is defined as any propo-
sitional combination of atoms with 0-ary operators ⊥,
⊤, unary operator not and binary operators ‘,’ and ‘;’.
A logic program is now a set of rules Head ← Body
where Head and Body are nested expressions (notice
that the rule conditional ← is the only operator that
cannot be nested). An example of such a rule could
be, for instance:
a, b← not (c; not d) (6)
Stable models for this kind of programs can be easily
described by a simple modification in the definition of
program reduct. We define now ΠI as the result of
replacing in Π every maximal occurrence5 of not F by
⊥ if I |= F or by ⊤ otherwise. Note that the previous
definition of reduct corresponds to the particular case
in which F is an atom.
An interesting result derived from this modified se-
mantics (proposition 7 in [11]) is that any program
with nested expressions is strongly equivalent to some
(non-nested) program, just consisting of rules like
(1). To obtain this non-nested program, the following
transformations are defined. Let F,G and H represent
nested expressions. By α⇔ β we mean that we replace
some regular occurrence of α by β. Then, we handle
the following strongly equivalent transformations:
(i) F,G⇔ G,F and F ;G⇔ G;F .
(ii) (F,G), H ⇔ F, (G,H) and
(F ;G);H ⇔ F ; (G;H).
(iii) F, (G;H)⇔ (F,G); (F,H) and
F ; (G,H)⇔ (F ;G), (F ;H).
(iv) not (F ;G)⇔ not F, not G and
not (F,G)⇔ not F ; not G.
(v) not not not F ⇔ not F .
(vi) F,⊤ ⇔ F and F ;⊤ ⇔ ⊤.
(vii) F,⊥ ⇔ ⊥ and F ;⊥ ⇔ F .
(viii) not ⊤ ⇔ ⊥ and not ⊥ ⇔ ⊤.
(ix) (F,G← H)⇔ (F ← H), (G← H).
(x) (F ← G;H)⇔ (F ← G), (F ← H).
(xi) (F ← G, not not H)⇔ (F ; not H ← G).
(xii) (F ; not not G← H)⇔ (F ← not G,H).
For instance, rule (6) can be successively transformed
as follows:
a, b← not c, not not d. By (iv)
a← not c, not not d,
b← not c, not not d. By (ix)
a; not d← not c,
b; not d← not c. By (xi)
This treatment of nested expressions exceeds the appli-
cability of our previous classical logic representation.
5That is, any not F that is not in the scope of an outer
not .
From a practical point of view, such a limitation is
not very important, since we can always unfold nested
expressions by applying (i)-(xii). Nevertheless, from a
theoretical point of view, this clearly points out that
the classical encoding fails as a real semantic charac-
terization for LP connectives.
As shown in [10], one of the important features of
the HT formalization, apart from the result for strong
equivalence, is that it preserves the above interpreta-
tion of nested expressions. We show next that a simi-
lar behavior can be obtained using standard 3-valued
logic (L3). Surprisingly, L3 provides the same inter-
pretation for nested expressions, but generally differs
once free nesting of rule conditionals is allowed.
5 L3: Three valued logic.
We will use propositional syntax plus Lukasiewicz’s
unary operator6 l . Intuitively, a formula lF is never
unknown and points out that F is valuated to true. In
this way, ¬lF would mean that “F is not true,” i.e.,
it is either false or unknown. If F,G are L3 formulas
and p an atom of the signature Σ then:
p, ¬F, F ∨G, ⊤, ⊥, lF
are also L3 formulas. Propositional derived operators
(∧,⊃,≡) are defined in the usual way.
A three valued interpretation M is a function M :
Σ −→ {0, 1/2, 1} assigning to each atom p ∈ Σ a truth
value M(p) which can be 0 (false), 1/2 (unknown) or
1 (true). We will usually represent M as the pair of
sets of atoms (Ip, Ia) respectively containing the pos-
itive (true) and consistent (non-false) atoms where,
of course, we require consistence: Ip ⊆ Ia. Conse-
quently:
M(p) =


1 if p ∈ Ip
0 if p 6∈ Ia
1/2 otherwise
Note that we use here the same notation as for the
pairs we handled in the reified approach. This is not
casual: the negative information of a 3-valued inter-
pretation will be used to represent default negation,
whereas the positive information will represent the set
of proved atoms.
Definition 5 (L3 valuation of a formula)
We extend the valuation function M to any formula
F , M(F ) ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}, so that:
6For instance, see [1], pag. 8, where l is denoted as ✷.
1) M(⊤) = 1 and M(⊥) = 0
2) M(¬F ) = 1−M(F )
3) M(F ∨G) = max(M(F ),M(G))
4) M(lF ) =
{
1 if M(F ) = 1
0 otherwise
✷
An interpretation M satisfies a formula F , written
M |=3 F when M(F ) = 1. When F is satisfied by
any interpretation, we call it an L3-tautology and write
|=3 F . As usual, an interpretation is a model of a the-
ory when it satisfies all its formulas. Maintaining the
previous terminology, a 3-valued interpretation M is
called total iff it has the shape M = (I, I), that is, it
contains no unknown atoms. Clearly, when consider-
ing total interpretations, the l operator can be simply
removed, and L3 collapses into 2-valued propositional
logic.
LP connectives are simply defined among the following
derived operators:
mF
def
= ¬l¬F
not F
def
= ¬mF
G← F
def
= (lF ⊃ lG) ∧ (mF ⊃mG)
F ↔ G
def
= (F ← G) ∧ (G← F )
It is easy to check that the derived semantics for each
one of these operators corresponds to:
5) M(mF ) =
{
1 if M(F ) 6= 0
0 otherwise
6) M(not F ) =
{
1 if M(F ) = 0
0 otherwise
7) M(G← F ) =
{
1 if M(F ) ≤M(G)
0 otherwise
8) M(F ↔ G) =
{
1 if M(F ) = M(G)
0 otherwise
Operator m acts is the dual of l , (mF can be read
as “F is consistent”) whereas implication ← is the
one proposed by Fitting [3] and Kunen [7]. When
we represent some program Π inside L3, we will con-
sider it as a single formula consisting in the conjunc-
tion of all the program rules. Note also that when
|=3 F ↔ G, we can apply uniform substitution in L3
as we would do in classical propositional logic. For
instance, |=3 (not F ) ↔ (⊥ ← F ) means that we can
replace any occurrence of (not F ) by (⊥ ← F ) and
vice versa. Let ◦ and • be two meta-operators, any
of them indistinctly representing l or m . Then, the
following formulas are also L3 tautologies:
◦ (F ∧G) ↔ ◦F ∧ ◦G (7)
◦ (F ∨G) ↔ ◦F ∨ ◦G (8)
• ◦ F ↔ ◦F (9)
•¬ ◦ F ↔ ¬ ◦ F (10)
As m is defined in terms7 of l , this means that we can
unfold any L3 formula until l is exclusively applied to
literals. Using these properties, the following lemma
can be easily proved:
Lemma 1 Let R be a pogram rule like (1), and let
the pair M = (Ip, Ia) have the common shape of
an L3-interpretation and a classical interpretation for
proved/assumed. Then, M |=3 R iff M |= R˙ ∧ R¨. ✷
Besides, by inspection on L3 semantics, we also have
that:
Lemma 2 For any transformation α⇔ β in (i)-(xii):
|=3 α↔ β. ✷
Theorem 4 Let Π1 and Π2 be two logic programs pos-
sibly containing nested expressions. Then Π1 and Π2
are strongly equivalent iff: |=3 lΠ1 ≡ lΠ2. ✷
Notice that we check lΠ1 ≡ lΠ2 instead of the stronger
condition Π1 ↔ Π2. To understand the difference,
consider Π1 = {a} and Π2 = {a ← ⊤}. The in-
terpretation M = ({a}, {a}) is the only model of
both programs and so, |=3 lΠ1 ≡ lΠ2. However,
Π1 ↔ Π2 is not a tautology, sinceM ′ = (∅, {a}) makes
M ′(Π1) = 1/2 6= 1 =M ′(Π2).
6 Differences with respect to HT
Theorem 4 shows that HT and L3 coincide in their
interpretations of programs with nested expressions.
The next natural question is, do the HT and L3 in-
terpretations coincide for any arbitrary theory? The
answer to this question is negative, as we will show
with a pair of counterexamples. Of course, due to
theorem 4, these counterexamples cannot be just pro-
grams with nested expressions, as defined in Section 4.
We study, for instance, a nested conditional, and the
negation of a conditional.
Consider the theory consisting of the singleton formula
(a← b)← c. In HT, this theory is equivalent to (a←
7Of course, we could have equally chosen the dual op-
erator m as the basic one.
b, c), which seems to be the most intuitive solution,
whereas in L3 it is actually equivalent to (a; not c ←
b). Both equivalences hold in classical propositional
logic. However, for computing stable models, their
behavior is quite different. For instance, the theory
{b, (a ← c), (c ← a), ((a ← b) ← c)} would have a
unique stable model {b} under the HT interpretation
whereas, under L3, an additional stable model {a, b, c}
is obtained.
The second example shows the most important prob-
lem of the L3 interpretation: once we allow arbitrary
theories, we may obtain non-subtotal models, some-
thing that does not happen8 in HT. Let Π be the the-
ory {b, not (a ← b)}. Its unique stable model is {b}
both in HT and L3. However, while the pair ({b}, {b})
is the unique HT model9 of Π, in L3 there exists a
second model ({b}, {a, b}) which is not subtotal. In
other words, when using L3 for this general syntax,
the set of L3 models does not fully characterize strong
equivalence.
7 Discussion
The study of strong equivalence is probably one of the
most active current topics in research in Logic Pro-
gramming, as it becomes evident by the increasing
amount of new results obtained recently (just to cite
three examples [16, 15, 2]).
In [15], a classical logic characterization is also pro-
vided, which presents several similarities with the ap-
proach we present here. The main difference of Pearce
et al’s method is that it actually relies on a syntactic
translation from HT into classical logic. This transla-
tion informally consists in a duplication of the atoms
in the signature so that an atom p denotes our proved
whereas an atom p′ would denote assumed. In this
paper, our initial motivation for using classical logic
was to improve the presentation and the understand-
ing. In this way, we have directly started from non-
nested programs, trying to capture the definition of
stable models in a way as direct as possible. As a
result, our characterization does not provide an inter-
pretation of nested connectives. In order to deal with
them, we would need to apply a previous step, using
transformations (i)-(xii). Pearce et al’s encoding starts
from HT logic, and so, deals with nested expressions
(in the same way as HT does). Besides, the transfor-
mation presented in [15] has the additional advantage
of being linear, while (i)-(xii) are not polynomial in
8See for instance Fact 1 in [10].
9In fact, the expression not (a← b) is HT-equivalent to
the pair of constraints (⊥ ← not b) and (⊥ ← a).
the general case. Despite of these two advantages of
Pearce et al’s approach, it must be noticed that none
of the two classical encodings can actually be consid-
ered a full-semantics for nested logic programs, since
in both cases, a previous syntactic transformation is re-
quired. Therefore, translation to classical logic is very
interesting for practical purposes, but is limited from
a purely semantic point of view.
Another similarity between our classical encoding with
respect to [15] is, not only how to decide strong equiv-
alence, but how to obtain stable models. In our Sec-
tion 3 we simply used to that purpose the result pre-
sented by Lin and Shoham in [13] and then included
slight variations that we proved to be sound. In [15],
a quantified boolean formula is used instead:
φ′ ∧ ¬∃V ((V < V ′) ∧ τHT [φ]) (11)
where V is the set of atoms, φ is the original program,
φ′ results from replacing any atom p by p′ and finally
τHT [φ] is Pearce et al’s translation from HT to classical
logic. On the other hand, Lin and Shoham’s result
involving circumscription can be formulated10 as:
(V = V ′) ∧ C[φ] ∧ ¬∃V ((V < V ′) ∧ C[φ]) (12)
where C[φ] simply replaces each not p by ¬p′. Notice
how, at least structurally, (12) is very similar to (11).
As for the L3 encoding, it must also be noticed
that other logical characterizations have been obtained
apart from HT. In [2], for instance, they use instead
another logic, KC, and show that this is, in fact, the
weakest intermediate logic (between intuitionistic and
classical) that allows capturing strong equivalence of
logic programs with nested expressions. An interest-
ing open question is how logic KC deals with nested
conditionals since, as we have shown, this is the case
where HT and L3 diverge.
The interest of the encoding we have presented is per-
haps the use of a multi-valued logic which is commonly
known and understood and yields a natural characteri-
zation. We believe that the use of L3 may be especially
suitable as a valid alternative for “by hand” studies of
strong equivalence, since it allows applying intuitive
properties of l and m operators (as an example, look
at the proofs in the appendix) in a more or less intu-
itive way.
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Appendix A. Proofs.
Proof of theorem 1
The right to left direction was proved in proposition
2. For the left to right direction, assume there is some
M = (Ip, Ia), M ∈ SUBT(Π˙1) but M 6∈ SUBT(Π˙2).
Let M ′ be the total pair M ′ = (Ia, Ia). We will show
that it is possible to construct a program Π so that Ia
is a stable model of Π1 ∪Π but not of Π2 ∪Π, or vice
versa. We consider two cases:
1. M ′ 6∈ SUBT(Π˙2). As M ∈ SUBT(Π˙1), by defini-
tion of SUBT, M ′ is model of Π˙1. We construct
the program Π = {p : p ∈ Ia}. Clearly, M ′ is
still model of Π˙1 ∧ Π˙ but, now, it is also minimal:
a strict subset of proved atoms is not allowed.
Therefore, Ia is a stable model of Π1 ∪Π. On the
other hand, as M ′ is total, but M ′ 6∈ SUBT(Π˙2),
then M ′ 6|= Π˙2. As a result, Ia cannot be stable
model of Π2 ∪ Π.
2. M ′ ∈ SUBT(Π˙2). Note first that, as M 6∈
SUBT(Π˙2) and M  M ′ we conclude M 6|= Π˙2
and M ≺M ′ . We construct the program:
Π = {p : p ∈ Ip} ∪
{(p← q) : p, q ∈ (Ia − Ip), p 6= q}
It is easy to see thatM ′ |= Π˙ and so,M ′ |= Π˙2∧Π˙.
We will show that M ′ is also minimal for that
theory. Let us assume that there exists another
model (J, Ia) strictly lower than M ′, J ⊂ Ia, and
try to reach a contradiction. As atoms of Ip are
facts of Π, but M = (Ip, Ia) is not model of Π˙2,
we must have: Ip ⊂ J . Now, take some q ∈
J − Ip and some p ∈ Ia − J . The rule p ← q
belongs to Π but (J, Ia) does not satisfy the rule
translation. Therefore, (J, Ia) 6|= Π˙ and we reach
a contradiction. Since we have proved that M ′ is
minimal, Ia is stable model of Π˙2∪ Π˙. Finally, we
study program Π1. It can be easily checked that
M |= Π˙ and soM |= Π˙1∪Π˙. But as M ≺M ′, M ′
is not minimal for Π˙1 ∪ Π˙ and so Ia is not stable
model for this program.
Proof of theorem 2
We start from CIRC[Π∗; proved] ∧ (3), observing that
the conjuncts Π¨ and (4) of Π∗ can be moved outside
the circumscription. The reason for this is that in
Π¨, predicate proved does not occur, whereas in (4)
it occurs negatively (considering α ⊃ β as ¬α ∨ β).
Therefore, we can respectively apply equivalence (3.2)
and proposition 3.3.1 in [8], to obtain the equivalent
formula:
CIRC[Π˙; proved] ∧ Π¨ ∧ (4) ∧ (3)
Now, notice that, by definition, the circumscription of
CIRC[Π˙; proved] has the shape of a conjunction Π˙∧α
(where α is a second order formula we do not need to
detail). So, the above formula is actually:
Π˙ ∧ α ∧ Π¨ ∧ (4) ∧ (3)
Finally, notice that (3) implies (4), whereas Π˙∧(3) im-
plies Π¨, and so, the implied conjuncts can be removed,
obtaining the equivalent formula:
Π˙ ∧ α ∧ (3)
which is nothing else but CIRC[Π˙; proved] ∧ (3).
Proof of property 1
We must show that M ′ = (Ia, Ia) is also model of Π∗.
Clearly, as Π¨ exclusively refers to predicate assumed,
M |= Π¨ iff M ′ |= Π¨. On the other hand, it is clear
that M ′ |= (4) – in fact, it further satisfies (3). So,
we only have to prove that M ′ |= Π˙. Assume that, for
some rule R ∈ Π, M ′ 6|= R˙, which in classical logic is
equivalent to M ′ |= ¬(R˙), i.e., M ′ must satisfy:
( r∧
i=1
proved(ci)
)
∧
( s∧
i=1
¬assumed(di)
)
∧
( n∧
i=1
¬proved(ai)
)
∧
( m∧
i=1
assumed(bi)
)
As in M ′, proved and assumed are equivalent, this
implies that M ′ must also satisfy:
( r∧
i=1
assumed(ci)
)
∧
( s∧
i=1
¬assumed(di)
)
∧
( n∧
i=1
¬assumed(ai)
)
∧
( m∧
i=1
assumed(bi)
)
But this formula is exactly ¬(R¨) and so,M ′ cannot be
model of Π¨ nor Π∗, reaching a contradiction.
Proof of lemma 1
Using properties (7)-(10) and the definitions of derived
operators, a general logic program rule like (1) is equiv-
alent to the conjunction of the pair of formulas:
l c1 ∧ · · · ∧ l cr ∧ ¬m d1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬m ds ⊃
l a1 ∨ · · · ∨ l an ∨ · · · ∨ ¬m b1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬m bm (A-1)
m c1 ∧ · · · ∧m cr ∧ ¬m d1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬m ds ⊃
m a1 ∨ · · · ∨m an ∨ · · · ∨ ¬m b1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬m bm (A-2)
Note that in formulas, operators l and m are only
applied to atoms and, vice versa, atoms only appear in
the scope of l andm . As the interpretation of l andm
is always bivalued, we can just consider the meaning of
each l p and m p individually and then interprete the
whole formula as a classical propositional one. Now,
note that l p is true iff p 6∈ Ip that is M |= proved(a),
and m p is true iff p ∈ Ia, that is, M |= assumed(a).
Therefore, (A-1) and (A-2) respectively correspond to
R˙ and R¨.
Proof of lemma 2
As ‘,’ and ‘;’ are simply understood as ∧ and ∨, prop-
erties (i)-(iii), (vi) and (vii) are straightforward.
(iv) The formula not (F ;G) is, by definition, ¬m (F ∨
G) which, by (8), is always valuated in the same
way as ¬(mF ∨ mG). As L3 satisfies the De
Morgan’s laws, this is equivalent to ¬mF ∧¬mG,
which by definition, is the formula not F, not G.
The other part of property (iv) is analogous.
(v) The formula not not not F is, by definition,
¬m¬m¬mF . By (10), we replace m¬mF by
¬mF obtaining ¬m¬¬mF , that is, ¬mmF .
Now, by (9) this is equivalent to ¬mF , which
is, by definition not F .
(viii) The formula not ⊥ is ¬m⊥. As m⊥ is always
valuated as 0 (false), this formula is equivalent to
¬⊥, that is, ⊤. The other part of (viii) is analo-
gous.
(ix) The formula (F,G← H) is, by definition:
(lH ⊃ l (F ∧G)) ∧ (mH ⊃m (F ∧G))
Applying (7) we obtain:
(lH ⊃ lF ∧ lG) ∧ (mH ⊃mF ∧mG)
This is equivalent to:
(¬lH ∨ lF ) ∧ (¬lH ∨ lG) ∧
(¬mH ∨mF ) ∧ (¬mH ∨mG)
(simply unfold the definition of ⊃ and apply dis-
tributivity). Finally, note that, by definition of
←, the last formula is just:
(F ← H) ∧ (G← H)
(ix) We just provide a proof sketch:
(l (G ∨H) ⊃ lF )∧
(m (G ∨H) ⊃mF ) Def. of ←
(lG ∨ lH ⊃ lF )∧
(mG ∨mH ⊃mF ) (8)
(lG ⊃ lF ) ∧ (mG ⊃mF )∧
(lH ⊃ lF ) ∧ (mH ⊃mF ) Def. of ⊃
(F ← G) ∧ (F ← H) Def. of ←
(x) Again, as a proof sketch:
(l (G ∧ ¬m¬mH) ⊃ lF )∧
(m (G ∧ ¬m¬mH) ⊃mF ) Def. of ←, not
(l (G ∧ ¬¬mH) ⊃ lF )∧
(m (G ∧ ¬¬mH) ⊃mF ) (10)
(lG ∧ lmH ⊃ lF )∧
(mG ∧mmH ⊃mF ) (7)
(lG ∧mH ⊃ lF )∧
(mG ∧mH ⊃mF ) (9)
(lG ⊃ lF ∨ ¬mH)∧
(mG ⊃mF ∨ ¬mH) Def. ⊃
F ; not H ← G Def. of ←, not
(xi) It is analogous to proof for (x).
Proof of theorem 4
First, from lemma 2 the corresponding non-nested pro-
gram has the same set of L3 models. Second, lemma
1 shows that this program has the same models than
our classical encoding. Therefore, we can directly ap-
ply theorem 3.
